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A study of arbitration clauses
in consumer and
non-consumer contracts
by THEODORE EISENBERG, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, and EMILY SHERWIN

andatory arbitration clauses have been in the spot- tion and favorable win-rates for claimants, and add that
light recently, as consumer advocates have chalreducing the costs of dispute resolution for firms means
lenged their legitimacy. Popular consumer products
lower prices for consumers.3
such as cellular phone servOpponents argue that
ice, credit cards, and dis- Mandatory arbitrati on clauses appeared
mandatory
arbitration
count brokerage often in more than threeclauses are imposed on
quarters of consumer consumers without full
come with fine print contracts in which the cuscontracts examin ed but in less than
consent and that arbitratomer agrees to submit
one-tenth of non- consumer contracts
tion deprives consumers of
disputes to arbitration
jury trials, reduces awards,
rather than to litigate in
negotiated by the same firms,
and fails to advance the
court. Typically, the cussuggesting thal the firms' faith
public's interest in detertomer also agrees not to
rence and law reform.
participate in aggregate
in arbitration is cEonsiderably weaker
More pointedly, oppoproceedings such as class
than they h ave claimed.
nents object to the use of
actions, either in court or
arbitration clauses to curbefore
an
arbitrator.
tail aggregate proceedAnother common contract provision makes arbitration
ings. Without the option of aggregate dispute
clauses and class arbitration waivers non-severable, so that if resolution, they maintain, small claims are not finanan arbitrator authorizes claimants to aggregate their claims,
cially viable in any forum. As a result, firms will escape
they must instead proceed in court. The combined effect of
these contractual provisions is to ensure that consumers
For helpful comments, we thank Jennifer Arlen, Oren Bar-Gill, Yun-chien
will pursue claims individually and before arbitrators, if at
Chang, Geerte Hesen, Christopher Leslie, Herbert Kritzer, Michael Levine,
all. Mandatory arbitration clauses also ensure that disputes Flornecia Marotta-Wurgler, Larry Ribstein, and participants at the NYU Law
Economics Workshop and the contracts panel at the 2008 Annual Meetbetween firms and consumers will not be decided byjuries. and
ing of the Association of American Law Schools. Benjamin Freshman and
Not surprisingly, firms that include arbitration clauses
Michael Ernemann provided excellent research assistance. Professor Eisenserves as a consultant for plaintiffs in a case raising a class action-arbiin their contracts with consumers have taken a strong berg
tration issue. An earlier version of this material was published as Arbitration's
public stand on the benefits of arbitration, not only for Summer Soldiers: An FmpiricalStudy of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonthemselves but for their customers. In litigation testing consumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH.J. L. REFORM 871 (2008). as Amicus Curiae in
1. See, e.g., Brief of CTIA-The Wireless Association
the validity of mandatory consumer arbitration, briefs on
Support of Affirmance 2, Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000 (Wash.
Brief of Respondent Cingular Wireless 39, Scott, supra; Discover
behalf of corporate defendants and industry groups 2007);
Bank's Answer to Anicus Curie [sic] Brief of Consumer Attorneys of Califorrepeatedly assert that arbitration saves both parties time
nia in Support of Real Party in Interest 13-14, Discover Bank v. Superior
113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005); Brief of Amici Curiae American Bankers'
and money and yields fair results for consumers.' Propo- Court,
Ass'n., Am. Financial Services Ass'n., & Consumer Bankers' Ass'n. in Support
nents of mandatory arbitration cite high levels of satisfac- of Petitioner Discover Bank 7, Discover, supra.
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ARBITRATION:
PLEASE READ THIS PROVISION OF THE AGREEMENT CAREFULLY.
IT PROVIDES THAT ANY DISPUTE MAY BE RESOLVED BY BINDING
ARBITRATION. ARBITRATION REPLACES THE RIGHT TO GO TO COURT,
INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO AJURY AND THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE
INACLASS ACTION OR SIMILAR PROCEEDING. INARBITRATION, A
DISPUTE IS RESOLVED BY AN ARBITRATOR INSTEAD OF AJUDGE OR
JURY. ARBITRATION PROCEDURES ARE SIMPLER AND MORE LIMITED
THAN COURT PROCEDURES.
Agreement to Arbitrate:

Either you or we may, without the other's consent, elect mandatory,
binding arbitration for any claim, dispute, or controversy between you
and us (called "Claims").

liability for misconduct
that imposes small per
'I
capita losses on large numbers
of consumers? Judicial responses to
mandatory arbitration have been
mixed, although several state courts
have recently found particular arbitration provisions unconscionable.'
Against this background, we conducted a study of contractual practices by well-known firms marketing
consumer products, comparing the
firms' consumer contracts with contracts the same firms negotiated with
business peers. The frequency of
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts has been studied before, as has
the frequency of arbitration clauses
in non-consumer contracts.7 Our

2. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in
Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Disputes?: An
Analysis ofActive Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT'LJ. CONFLICT MGMT. 369, 378 (1995) (reporting favorable
employee win-rates in employment-related arbitration); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. Rcv. 29, 45-51 (1998) (citing studies of
win-rates, awards, and participant satisfaction in
arbitration and litigation); Eric J. Mogilnicki &
Kirk D. Jensen, Arbitration and Unconscionability,19
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 761, 763-65 (2003) (citing studies of outcomes in arbitration and litigation).
3. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of
Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration
Agreements, 2001 J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 89 (2001).
4. Richard M. Alderman, Pre-disputeMandatory
Arbitration in Consumer Contracts:A Callfor Reform,
38 HOUSTON L. REv. 1237 (2001); Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Arbitration,67 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (2004); Paul Carrington,
Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 361
(2003); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The
Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class
Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005); Jean R.
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It
just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005).

study is the first to compare the use
of arbitration clauses within firms, in
different contractual contexts.
The results are striking: in our
sample,
mandatory
arbitration
clauses appeared in more than three5. Samuel Issacharoff & Erin E Delaney, Credit
CardAccountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 158 (2006);
Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using
Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 103 (2004).
6. See, e.g., Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d
1000 (Wash. 2007).
7. See, e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R.
Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 2004 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 55 (2004) (finding that arbitration clauses
appeared in 35% of a varied sample of consumer
contracts); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical
Study ofEx Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contractsof
Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 335
(2007) (finding that arbitration clauses appeared
in 11% of material contracts of large corporate
firms); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, "Unfair" Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About Nothing?, in
Omri Ben-Shahar (ed.) BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNnATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45, 47-48 (2007)
(finding that arbitration clauses appeared in
about 6% of 597 online end-user software
licenses).

quarters of consumer contracts and less than one tenth of
non-consumer contracts (excluding employment contracts) negotiated by the same firms. This suggests
that the firms' faith in arbitration is
considerably weaker than they have
claimed. For the purpose of businessto-business disputes, in which they
may be either plaintiffs or defendants, they prefer the option to litigate in court.
We approached our project with
several hypotheses in mind. First,
because the firms we studied, or
trade organizations to which they
belong, have publicly endorsed arbitration as speedy, cost-effective, and
fair, and because speed, cost-effectiveness, and fairness are desirable in
any contractual dispute, one would
expect firms to provide consistently
for arbitration in contracts of all
types. Second, because businesses
have often expressed a skeptical view
of the reliability of juries as fact-finders, one would expect firms to provide consistently for non-jury trials,
even in the absence of mandatory
arbitration provisions. Neither of
these hypotheses were confirmed by
our data. Instead, both the firms'
preference for arbitration and their
aversity to jury trials pertained primarily to disputes with consumers.

The study
To conduct the study, we first identified firms with significant market
www.ajs.org JUDICATURE
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Table 1. Companies and contract types
Contract type
Company
Consumer
AT&T
1
AlItel
1
American Express
1
Ameriprise
1
Ameritrade
1
Bank of America
1
Cablevision
3
CellularOne
1
Charles Schwab
2
Charter Commun.
1
Chase
2
Citigroup
2
Comcast
1
Cox
1
ETrade
1
GE/GE Money Bank,
1
Owest
1
Sprint
1
Time Warner
1
U.S. Cellular
1
Verizon
1
Total
26

Employment
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
3
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
3
0
0
0
14

Material
contracts
17
12
8
7
8
6
7
9
11
9
6
2
10
1
1
8
7
3
10
5
3

150

Total
18
13
9
8
15
7
10
13
13
11
8
4
11
2
2
9
9
7
11
6
4
190

'GE Money Bank describes itself as "the consumer and small business financial services unit of General Electric."
http://www.gemoney.com/about us/index.htmi, accessed Dec. 14, 2007.
Sources. Authors' collection of consumer contracts: EDGAR database Form 8-K and Form 10 -K filings, Jan. 1, 2006
to Aug. 13, 2007.

Table 2. Rate of arbitration clauses
by contract type
Contract type
Consumer (N)
Percent
Employment (N)
Percent
Other material contract (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent

Arbitration clause
Yes
20
76.9
13
92.9
9
6.1
42
23.7

Total
26
100.0
14
100.0
147
100.0
187
100.0

Sources. Authors' collection of consumer contracts: EDGAR database Form 8-K and Form 10-K, Jan. 1, 2006 to
Aug.13,2007.

shares or name recognition in the
sectors of telecommunications, consumer credit, and discount brokerage (see Table 1). Most of the firms
are on Fortune magazine's list of the
top 100 American companies; others
are close to the top 100 or wellknown within their industry sector.
120

We then collected consumer agreements drafted and used by each firm
to regulate ongoing relationships
between the firm and consumers of
its services. The contracts we studied
were current in July and August,
2007. Some were available to anyone
visiting the firm's web site; others
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were available through a link or window that appeared in the process of
placing an order; others were available only by mail after completing
an order.8
Next, we searched for non-consumer contracts entered into by the
same firm in a data base of required
SEC filings (forms 8-K and 10-K)
from January 1, 2006 to August 13,
2007. (Firms registered with the
SEC must file current and annual
reports listing, among other things,
contracts that materially affect the
company's financial condition.)
Typical filings included stock purchase agreements, credit and security agreements, and pooling and
service agreements for loans. Material contracts filed with the SEC also
included employment agreements
(usually with key employees) and
related agreements governing benefits and incentives. The economic
significance of all these contracts
suggests that they were negotiated
with care.
Our study covered 21 firms.
Seven of these provide cellular
phone service, five provide "triple
play" cable service (CATV, Internet,
and phone), four provide brokerage service, and five are banks or
finance companies issuing credit
cards to consumers. We reviewed
26 consumer contracts and 164
non-consumer contracts. Fourteen
of the non-consumer contracts
related to employment. Because
employment contracts differed significantly from other non-consumer contracts in their treatment
of arbitration, we segregated these
contracts for separate analysis.
We coded both consumer and
non-consumer contracts for the
presence of mandatory arbitration

8. For example, Walmart (Fortune's#1) provides
credit card applicants with a "disclosure" statement at the time of application, then mails the
full consumer agreement to the customer when
the application is accepted. Telephone requests
for an advance copy of the agreement, prior to
submission of an application containing personal
financial information, were declined on the
ground that the company did not furnish its contracts to 'just anyone." Telephone conversation
with Walmart customer serviceJune 15, 2007. The
consumer contract that Walmart sends is in fact a
contract with GE Money Bank.

clauses, class action waivers, jury
trial waivers, choice of law provisions, forum selection clauses, and
provisions for payment of costs,
including attorney's fees. If the contract required arbitration, we coded
for waivers of class arbitration, rules
governing arbitration, arbitration
venue selection, and provisions on
fees. We also noted and coded for a
common non-severability provision
stating that in the event aggregate
proceedings are authorized in arbitration, arbitration is no longer
required.
Most significantly, we found that
more than 75 percent of consumer
contracts in our sample included
mandatory arbitration clauses, while
fewer than 10 percent of non-consumer agreements provided for
arbitration (see Table 2). Excluding
employment
contracts,
which
required arbitration at a very high
rate (90 percent), the comparison is
more dramatic: fewer than 6 percent of non-employment, non-consumer contracts provided for
arbitration. Only 8 of our 21 firms
provided for arbitration in any nonemployment, non-consumer contracts, and no firm provided for
arbitration in more than one such
contract. Thus, in our sample, firms
overwhelmingly selected arbitration
as the method for resolving consumer disputes but left open the
choice of litigation in business-tobusiness disputes.
Class-action waivers
Our findings on provisions relating
to aggregation of claims are also significant (see Tables 3, 4, and 5).
Every consumer contract with a
mandatory arbitration clause also
included a waiver of the right to participate in class-wide arbitration, and
60 percent of consumer contracts
with mandatory arbitration clauses
provided that in the event of class
arbitration, the arbitration clause
would no longer be effective. Thus, if
a court or arbitrator authorized
claimants to arbitrate as a class the
firm could elect to litigate instead.
Eighty percent of consumer contracts
also provided independently for a

Table 3. Pattern of class arbitration waiver
in contracts with arbitration clauses
Contract type
Consumer (N)
Percent
Employment (N)
Percent
Other material contract (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent

No
0
0
13
100.0

Class arbitration waiver
Total
Yes
20
20
100.0
100.0
13
0
100.0
0.0
7
100.0
40
100.0

Table 4. Pattern of void arbitration
clauses in the event of class action
arbitration

Contract type
Consumer (N)
Percent
Employment (N)
Percent
Other material contract (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent

Arbitration clause void if class
arbitration permitted clause void
No
Yes
Total
8
12
20
40.0
60.0
100.0
13
0
13
100.0
0.0
100.0
7
0
7
100.0
0.0
100.0
28
12
40
70.0
30.0
100.0

Table 5. Pattern of class action waiver in
contracts with arbitration clauses
Contract type
Consumer (N)
Percent
Employment (N)
Percent
Other material contract (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent

No
4
20.0
13
100.0
5
71.4
22
55.0

Class action waiver
Yes
Total
16
20
80.0
100.0
0
0.0

13
100.0

2
28.6
18

7
100.0
40

45.0

100.0

Sources for Tables 3, 4, and 5. Authors' collection of consumer contracts: EDGAR database Form 8-K and Form
10-K filings, Jan. 1,2006 to Aug. 13, 2007.

waiver of the right to litigate as a class.
Yet, in the approximately 23 percent
of consumer contracts that did not
require arbitration of disputes, there

were no class action waivers.
Non-consumer contracts looked
quite different. Among the 90 percent
of employment-related contracts that
www.ajs.org JUDICATURE
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Table 6. Summary of jury trial waiver
clauses by contract type
Sample limited to contracts
without arbitration clauses

Contract type
Consumer (N)
Percent
Employment (N)
Percent
Other material
contract (N)
Percent
Total (N)
Percent

(1)
No jury
trial waiver
6
100.0
1
100.0

(2)
Jury trial
waiver
0
0
0
0

103
74.6
110
75.9

35
25.4
35
24.1

Arbitration clauses treated
as jury trial waivers
(3)
No jury

(4)
Jury trial

trial waiver
6
23.1
1
7.1

waiver
20
76.9
13
92.9

Sources. Authors' collection of consumer contracts: EDGAR database Form 8-K and Form 10-K filings, Jan. 1, 2006
to Aug. 13, 2007. Columns (3) and (4) treat arbitration clauses as jury trial waivers.

provided for arbitration, none precluded class proceedings. Among the
few non-employment, non-consumer
contracts that required arbitration,
only 28 percent provided for a waiver
of class arbitration and none provided
for a waiver of class litigation or for a
litigation option in case class arbitration was approved.9 Thus, our firms
consistently provided against aggregation of consumer claims, but did not
rule out aggregate proceedings in
employment-related and business-tobusiness disputes.

Jury-trial waivers
Finally, we found that most non-consumer contracts that did not contain
arbitration clauses (75 percent) also
did not contain jury-trial waivers (see
Table 6). Again, consumer contracts
looked quite different: treating
mandatory arbitration clauses as
effective waivers of the right to ajury
trial, more than 75 percent of consumer contracts provided for nonjury fact-finding. It appears that
firms preferred to eliminate jury trials in consumer disputes (as well as
employment disputes) but preserve
jury trial rights in business-to-business disputes.
Marked variation
In sum, despite their rhetorical
122

stance in favor of arbitration, the
firms in our sample did not uniformly include arbitration clauses in
their contracts. Instead, the use of
arbitration clauses varied markedly
according to the contract type: arbitration clauses appeared routinely
in employment contracts (92.9 percent), frequently in consumer contracts (76.9 percent), and rarely in
non-employment, non-consumer
business contracts (6.1 percent). In
consumer contracts, mandatory
arbitration clauses were coupled
uniformly with provisions barring
class arbitration, and frequently
with non-severability clauses and
waivers of class litigation.
This pattern suggests that firms do
not in fact view arbitration as a generally superior method of dispute resolution that can save time and money
without affecting the fairness of outcomes. Rather, for the purpose of
resolving important business-to-business disputes, they prefer the option
of litigation, without limits on
process. Admittedly, there are objective differences between consumer
disputes and disputes that arise
under material business contracts.
When negotiating contracts, business
parties may be reluctant to demand
arbitration because the demand
might be taken as signaling a propen-
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sity to breach; they might also anticipate that in the event of breach, they
can agree to arbitrate if arbitration
appears preferable. Business parties
may also prefer to preserve their
options, reasoning that the nature
and complexity of disputes arising
under major contracts is difficult to
predict. Yet, consumer disputes can
be complex as well, and can develop
in unpredictable ways. Accordingly,
we believe the most plausible explanation for the contractual patterns
we observed is also the simplest: outside the context of consumer disputes, firms view arbitration as a less
desirable option than litigation.
We note that in one category of
non-consumer contracts-employment
related
contracts-firms
strongly favored arbitration over litigation. This preference, however,
appears to be due to the fact that senior employees and their corporate
employers have a common interest in
keeping the details of their disputes
confidential; therefore both are likely
to prefer private arbitration over litigation in a public forum.

Motives
In addition to implying that the
public support consumer-sector
firms have voiced for arbitration
does not extend to non-employment, non-consumer disputes, our
data lend support to the argument
that a significant motive for mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts is to prevent aggregation
of consumers' claims. Data aside,
this is a plausible argument. For several reasons, firms naturally prefer
to face consumer claims individually
rather than in aggregate proceedings. Aggregation of claims creates
settlement pressure, as firms seek to
avoid the risk of a large damage
award. Moreover, when the damage
caused to each consumer is small,
individual claims may not be viable,
even in arbitration. If so, avoiding
an aggregate proceeding may mean
avoiding liability altogether. Yet, a
9. In these respects, the differences between
consumer agreements and non-consumer agreements are statistically significant at p<0.001.

straightforward contractual waiver
of class-wide dispute resolution
might be invalidated by courts on
grounds of unconscionability, and
in any event a direct attempt to suppress aggregate claims might be
unwise from the standpoint of public relations.
Arbitration clauses, in contrast,
allow firms to argue that they are
adopting dispute resolution procedures in the best interest of their
customers. Moreover, arbitration
clauses are protected by a federal
policy in favor of arbitration, which
courts have adopted by interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Thus, a class action waiver embedded in an arbitration clause may
have a better chance of survival
than a class action waiver standing
alone.1"
Our data, while not conclusive,
tend to confirm this account of company motives. As noted, most of the
consumer contracts studied contained both mandatory arbitration
clauses and class waiver provisions.
This correlation did not hold true in
employment contracts, which typically contained mandatory arbitration clauses but no class waiver
provisions. Although the sample of
non-employment,
non-consumer
agreements with arbitration clauses
was rather small (9), only two of
these contracts combined arbitration
with a class waiver provision.
A further point is that a majority of
consumer contracts (and no other
contracts) contained nonseverability
clauses, which eliminated the arbitration requirement in the event of a
judicial or arbitral decision to authorize class arbitration. Thus, it appears
that when consumers proceed as a
class, firms prefer litigation over arbitration. We can speculate about various reasons for this preference: firms
may expect courts to apply stricter
class certification requirements than
arbitrators; defense lawyers may have
10. Gilles, supran. 4 (describing a dramatic rise
in the use of arbitration clauses in the wake of
favorable federal decisions, coincident with an
increase in corporate anxiety over consumer class
actions).
11. Demaine & Hensler, supran. 7, at 63-64.

more experience with class litigation
than with class arbitration and prefer
to proceed on familiar ground; firms
may fear that arbitrators will be
inclined to split the difference
between parties rather than rule decisively in their favor; and firms may
wish to preserve their right to appeal
large judgments. In any event, the
high incidence of these clauses in
consumer contracts suggests that
from the firms' point of view, concerns about class arbitration by consumers quickly overwhelms whatever
benefits arbitration may hold.
The high incidence of arbitration
clauses in the particular types of consumer contracts we studied also provides indirect support for the theory
that firms use mandatory arbitration
clauses as a strategy to suppress aggregate proceedings by consumers.
Other studies suggest that the rate of
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts varies by industry type: in some
categories (including ours) arbitration clauses are prevalent; in others
they are comparatively rare. For
example, in a 2004 study of consumer
contracts by Linda Demaine and Deborah Hensler, the rate of arbitration
clauses in 21 contract categories was
less than 10 percent, while the overall
rate was 35 percent-less than half
the rate we observed." To some
extent, this variation may reflect
industry concentration: the sectors we
studied (cellular phone service,
telecommunications, credit cards, discount brokerage) are dominated by a
small number of firms, making it
harder for consumers to shop for
terms. More significantly, in the sectors we studied, firm practices and
policies are particularly likely to cause
minor harms to many similarly situated customers. As a result, firms in
these sectors have particular reason to
avoid class claims: consumers who are
not likely to proceed individually
against the firm present a substantial
economic threat when they are able
to aggregate their claims. In contrast,
firms in sectors for which rate of arbitration clauses is low (rental property
managers, grocers, restaurants, and
the like) are less likely to face class
claims for small individual losses.

Our data are also consistent with
the view that firms are suspicious of
juries as fact-finders in consumer disputes, and use arbitration clauses to
avoid them. Overall, we found a
fairly low rate of jury trial waivers in
our sample of contracts (just over 25
percent in contracts without arbitration clauses). However, arbitration
clauses, which appeared in more
than 75 percent of consumer agreements, effectively preclude jury trials. Thus, firms may view mandatory
arbitration as a way to circumvent
both aggregation of claims and factfinding by juries, under the guise of
a consumer-friendly mechanism for
dispute resolution.
Overall, our study suggests that the
asserted benefits of arbitration-fair
outcomes arrived at faster and at
lower cost-are not the dominant
motives for inclusion of arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts in the
industries we studied. Firms that
required arbitration of consumer
disputes did not favor arbitration in
their non-consumer contracts. The
most likely explanation for the pattern we observed is that firms value
arbitration clauses for their effects in
suppressing aggregate proceedings
by consumers, and perhaps averting
liability for widespread but low-value
wrongs. V
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